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Abstract
Both cognitive linguists and relevance theorists are developing original ap-
proaches to metaphor. Both shed new light on old debates and suggest fruitful 
directions for research. Although there has so far been little interaction be-
tween the two approaches, Raymond Gibbs and Markus Tendahl (2006, 2008) 
have recently begun to compare them and consider how they might be com-
bined. This paper is intended as a contribution to that debate. After outlining 
some parallels and differences between the two approaches, I will discuss how 
they might fit together to give a fuller picture of the role of metaphor in lan-
guage and thought.
1.	 Introduction
In the last 25 years, traditional approaches to metaphor (in classical rhetoric or 
Gricean pragmatics, for instance) have been increasingly questioned on both 
theoretical and experimental grounds. Where traditional approaches treat met-
aphor as a departure from a maxim, norm, or convention of literal truthfulness, 
there is a growing consensus that the Romantic critics of classical rhetoric 
were right to see metaphor as entirely normal, natural and pervasive in lan-
guage. Where traditional approaches treat metaphor as a purely decorative de-
vice with little or no cognitive significance, it is increasingly recognized that 
most metaphors cannot be paraphrased in literal terms without loss to the 
meaning. Relevance theorists and cognitive linguists, who have both explicitly 
distanced themselves from traditional approaches to metaphor, are part of this 
growing consensus.
However, relevance theorists and cognitive linguists see metaphor as en-
tirely normal and natural for rather different reasons. Cognitive linguists have 
argued that metaphor is pervasive in language because it is pervasive in 
thought.1 As Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 153) put it, “Metaphor is primarily a 
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matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language.” On 
this approach, linguistic metaphors are treated as surface reflections of under-
lying conceptual mappings between different cognitive domains (e.g., the do-
mains of love affairs and journeys, theories and buildings, arguments and 
fights), and have their roots in cognition rather than communication. Relevance 
theorists, on the other hand, have argued that metaphor arises naturally in lin-
guistic communication, as language is loosely used in an attempt to convey 
complex thoughts that may be vague, but need not themselves be metaphorical. 
On this approach, there is a continuum of cases between literal talk, loose talk, 
hyperbole and metaphor, none of which is necessarily a surface reflection of 
any pre-existing conceptual mapping. As Sperber and Wilson (2008: 84) put it, 
“We see metaphors as simply a range of cases at one end of a continuum that 
includes literal, loose and hyperbolic interpretations. In our view, metaphorical 
interpretations are arrived at in exactly the same way as these other interpreta-
tions. There is no mechanism specific to metaphor, no interesting generalisa-
tion that applies only to them.”
Until recently, relevance theorists and cognitive linguists have been more 
concerned with developing and applying their own approaches than comparing 
them with those of others. A notable exception has been Raymond Gibbs, 
whose pioneering experimental work draws on elements of both cognitive lin-
guistics and relevance theory, and has had an important influence on both. In 
two recent papers, Gibbs and Markus Tendahl (2006, 2008) suggest that, de-
spite some fundamental differences, relevance theory and cognitive linguistics 
may be seen as providing complementary rather than contradictory approaches 
to metaphor, and have begun to consider how they might be combined:
Many metaphor scholars [ . . . ] see these alternative theories as being radically differ-
ent. After all, cognitive linguistics and relevance theory adhere to very different goals 
and methodological assumptions. [ . . . ] These different goals and working assump-
tions are so great, in fact, that few metaphor scholars have tried to systematically com-
pare these two theories to understand how and why they differ. Yet there is also a small 
underground movement, as we have personally noted at various metaphor conferences, 
to begin thinking about ways that cognitive linguistics and relevance theory perspec-
tives on metaphor may be complementary. These discussions arise as metaphor scholars 
[ . . . ] struggle with the deficiencies of each theory and begin to understand that both 
perspectives have something very important to contribute toward a comprehensive, 
cognitive theory of metaphor. (Tendahl and Gibbs 2008: 1824)
In this paper, I would like to take up Gibbs and Tendahl’s challenge and sug-
gest some ways in which the two approaches to metaphor might combine.
One way of reconciling the apparently incompatible views of relevance 
theorists and cognitive linguists about the origin of metaphors would be to look 
for evidence that some metaphors arise in language use and others in thought. 
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As Gibbs and Tendahl point out, relevance theorists and cognitive linguists 
tend to focus on metaphors of rather different types. Whereas relevance theo-
rists offer many analyses of standard examples such as (1a)–(1c), which are 
familiar from classical rhetoric, cognitive linguists have been more concerned 
with examples such as (2a)–(2c), which they see as reflecting conceptual map-
pings across cognitive domains:
(1) a. Robert is a computer.
 b. Susan is a wild rose.
 c. Sally is an angel.
(2) a. Bill’s marriage is on the rocks. (love is a journey)
 b. He destroyed my defenses. (arguments are fights)
 c. Your theory is falling apart. (theories are buildings)
For anyone attempting a unitary account of metaphor, the challenge would be 
to show how both types of example can be analyzed in the same way. In fact, 
relevance theorists have consistently argued that terms such as “metaphor” and 
“irony” pick out a variety of loosely related phenomena that do not necessarily 
all work in the same way: In other words, they have consistently argued that 
metaphor and irony are not natural kinds. There is, thus, a genuine question 
about whether the examples in (1) and (2) exploit the same cognitive and com-
municative mechanisms, and if so, whether they fit better with the relevance 
theory or the cognitive linguistics approach.
A further way of exploring the possible interrelations between the relevance 
theory and cognitive linguistic treatments of metaphor would be to look at the 
central role of concepts in both approaches. According to relevance theory, 
hearers understand linguistic metaphors by using linguistic and contextual 
clues to create new “ad hoc” (occasion-specific) concepts, which are typically 
not identical to any of the concepts linguistically encoded by the m etaphorically 
used word or phrase, although they inherit some of their inferential properties 
from those concepts. It might then be reasonable to assume that the repeated 
use of linguistic metaphors linking items from distinct cognitive domains 
might set up patterns of conceptual activation similar to those that cognitive 
linguists see as characteristic of conceptual metaphor. To take just one illustra-
tion, many cultures have a set of flower metaphors (e.g., daisy, lily, violet, rose) 
that are typically applied to women. From a cognitive linguistics perspective, 
these linguistic metaphors might be seen as surface reflections of an underlying 
conceptual metaphor women are flowers, based on systematic c orrespondences 
between the domains of women and flowers. From a relevance theory perspec-
tive, these linguistic metaphors would be seen as originating in creative uses of 
language for opportunistic communicative purposes, which, if repeated often 
enough, might result in the setting up of systematic correspondences between 
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the domains of women and flowers. Here again, there is a genuine question 
about whether, and to what extent, conceptual cross-domain mappings origi-
nate in language use, and are therefore to be explained at least partly in prag-
matic terms.
My aim in this paper is to argue that relevance theory offers a genuine alter-
native to cognitive linguistic approaches to metaphor, and can complement 
these approaches in at least two ways: first, by showing how some metaphors 
can arise as creative loose uses of language, and second, by showing how the 
idea that linguistic metaphors create new “ad hoc” concepts has interesting 
implications for the cognitive linguistics treatment of metaphor. I hope the re-
sulting picture will provide a basis for future discussion and stimulate further 
research on the possible interrelations between the two approaches.
2.	 Metaphor	and	lexical	pragmatics:	How	word	meanings	are	modified	
in	use
The aim of a pragmatic account of metaphor is to explain how hearers recog-
nize the intended meaning of a metaphorical utterance in context. According to 
relevance theory, linguistic metaphors originate as loose uses of language, in 
which a word or phrase is used to communicate a novel “ad hoc” concept 
which is broader (more general) than the encoded lexical meaning. In the 
 metaphor Robert is a computer, for instance, the sentence uttered is (3a), and 
the encoded lexical meaning of the word computer is the concept computer, 
which denotes a certain type of machine used for processing information:
(3) a. Sentence uttered: Robert is a computer
 b. Lexical meaning of	“computer”: computer (i.e., a type of machine)
What the speaker communicates by use of the word computer in (3a), however, 
is not the lexical meaning computer but an “ad hoc” concept with a broader 
denotation, which is constructed in the course of interpreting (3a), and which 
applies not only to actual computers, but also to people who share some of the 
encyclopedic properties of computers (for instance, they process information 
accurately, lack common sense, intuition, human feelings, and so on). Thus, 
what might be communicated by uttering (3a) on a particular occasion could be 
represented as in (4), where computer* is a broader, “ad hoc” concept the de-
notation of which includes both computers and some humans:
(4) a. Speaker’s explicit meaning: Robert is a computer*
 b. Implicatures: Robert lacks feelings, processes information well, etc.
Relevance theory’s treatment of metaphor is part of a more general approach 
to lexical pragmatics, which is based on the following assumptions. First, the 
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lexical meaning of a word is merely a clue to the speaker’s meaning, and the 
concept communicated by use of a word typically differs from the lexical 
meaning. Second, metaphor is just one of many ways in which lexical mean-
ings can be modified in use. The concept communicated by use of a word may 
be narrower (more specific) or broader (more general) than the lexical meaning 
(or it may be narrower in some respects and broader in others, as is often the 
case in metaphor). Third, there is a continuum of cases of broadening, ranging 
from strictly literal use, through various shades of approximation to hyperbole 
and metaphor, with no sharp cut-off point between them. Fourth, all these cases 
are interpreted in the same way: There are no special pragmatic principles or 
mechanisms that apply only to metaphors. And fifth, contrary to what is gener-
ally assumed in Gricean pragmatics and philosophy of language, the concept 
communicated by use of a word contributes to what the speaker is taken to 
have asserted (i.e., the truth-conditional content of the utterance), and not only 
to what is implicated (Wilson and Carston 2007; Sperber and Wilson 2008). 
Since metaphorical uses of language — just like strictly literal uses —  contribute 
to truth-conditional content and fall within the scope of logical connectives, 
they cannot be dismissed as marginal to the concerns of linguistics proper.2
The case of lexical narrowing can be illustrated using an example from Fau-
connier and Turner (2002: 27). As Fauconnier and Turner point out, the phrase 
red pencil is semantically very vague: The concept red pencil applies to any 
pencil that stands in some relation to the color red, e.g., pencils that are painted 
red, pencils that write in red, pencils smeared with lipstick, pencils used to re-
cord the activities of a team dressed in red, and so on. Still, when a teacher 
marking an essay says, “I need a red pencil,” she will certainly have some 
specific sub-type of red pencil in mind, and in order to understand her, the 
hearer must infer what particular type of red pencil this is. In other words, the 
teacher must be understood as asking not simply for a red pencil, but for a red 
pencil*, where red pencil* denotes the particular sub-type of pencil she has in 
mind. The interpretation of virtually any utterance involves some such form of 
lexical narrowing, and one of the goals of lexical pragmatics is to explain how 
it is achieved.
Similarly, the interpretation of virtually any utterance involves some form of 
lexical broadening, in which the concept communicated by use of a word is 
more general than the lexical meaning. The broadening can be almost imper-
ceptible, as in the following cases of approximation:
(5) a. The play starts at 7.
 b. Jane’s hair is straight.
The speaker of (5a) would generally be understood as communicating that the 
play starts, not at 7 on the dot, but at approximately 7 (i.e., 7*), and the speaker 
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of (5b) would generally be understood as communicating that Jane’s hair is, 
not straight in the strict geometric sense, but merely straight in an approximate 
sense appropriate to human hair (i.e., straight*). The interpretation of virtu-
ally any utterance involves similar types of approximation, where a term with 
a strict meaning is loosely applied to what Lasersohn (1999) calls a “penum-
bra” of cases that fall just outside the linguistically specified denotation.
According to relevance theory, approximation shades off imperceptibly into 
hyperbole. Consider the utterances in (6):
(6) a. The lecture hall was empty.
 b. The water is freezing.
Let’s suppose that empty in (6a) is narrowed to mean “empty of people” (as 
opposed, say, to “empty of furniture”). Then the utterance would traditionally 
count as an approximation if the speaker is taken to mean that there were only 
a very few people present. In this case, use of the word empty would be under-
stood as intended to convey a concept empty*, meaning “close enough to empty 
for the differences to be inconsequential.” By contrast, the same utterance 
would traditionally count as a hyperbole if the speaker is taken to mean that, 
although many people were present, there were more empty seats than might 
have been expected or desired. In this case, use of the word empty would be 
understood as intended to convey a broader concept empty**, meaning “closer 
to empty than expected or desired.” Here, it is easy to see there is a whole con-
tinuum of intermediate cases, with no sharp cut-off point between approxima-
tion and hyperbole. For relevance theorists, this is not a matter for concern, 
since they claim that the distinction between approximation and hyperbole has 
no theoretical significance: An utterance does not have to be recognized as an 
approximation or hyperbole to be understood, no special interpretive mecha-
nisms are needed in either case, and both are understood in the same way. 
However, for theories that draw a sharp distinction between literal and figura-
tive uses of language, or that treat approximation and hyperbole as involving 
different interpretive mechanisms, the fact that there is no clear cut-off point 
between them should be a serious matter for concern. Similar points apply to 
(6b), where there is a continuum of cases between the use of freezing to mean 
‘actually freezing,’ ‘almost freezing,’ and ‘closer to freezing than expected or 
desired.’
Although metaphor has received a great deal of attention in cognitive lin-
guistics, and in philosophy and psychology more generally, hyperbole has re-
ceived much less attention. According to relevance theory, there is no clear 
dividing line between hyperbole and metaphor, and an adequate account of 
metaphor should therefore apply to hyperbole in the same way. To illustrate, 
consider the utterances in (7):
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(7) a. John is a giant.
 b. John is as tall as the Eiffel Tower.
 c. John is incredibly tall.
One possible way of distinguishing hyperbole from metaphor would be to treat 
hyperbole as involving an increase in quantity along a single dimension (e.g., 
height), while metaphor would involve a qualitative change (so that the speaker 
in metaphorical uses of (7) would be understood as attributing to John proper-
ties not directly linked to height). According to this criterion, (7a) would count 
as a hyperbole if taken to mean that John is very tall for a human, and as a 
metaphor if taken to mean that John stands out for other reasons than simply 
his height. However, again there is a gradient between the two types of case, 
with increases in quantity along a single dimension ultimately leading to a 
qualitative change. For instance, all three utterances in (7) activate thoughts of 
John’s height as being not merely human but superhuman, and these carry 
implications for other properties than simply his height. Thus, hyperbole shades 
off imperceptibly into metaphor, and is not reducible to an ornamental device 
with little or no cognitive significance. From a cognitive linguistics perspec-
tive, if metaphor is analyzed in terms of cross-domain mapping, it follows that 
hyperbole must be analyzed in a similar way. But while hyperboles such as 
(7a) or (7b) might conceivably be analyzed in terms of such mappings (e.g., 
between the domains of people and superhumans, or people and buildings), 
o thers, such as (7c), have no obvious analysis in conceptual metaphor terms.
The relevance theory approach to lexical pragmatics suggests that it should 
be possible to find a single utterance that can be intended and understood liter-
ally, loosely, hyperbolically, or metaphorically on different occasions. Here is 
an illustration:
(8) The audience slept through the lecture.
In certain circumstances, an utterance of (8) might be intended and understood 
as making the very strong claim that the audience was literally asleep through-
out the lecture. In other circumstances, it might be intended and understood as 
making the slightly weaker claim that the audience was, if not literally asleep, 
at least on the point of falling asleep during the lecture; in traditional terms, it 
would then count as an approximation. In different circumstances, (8) might be 
intended and understood as claiming, still more weakly, that the audience was, 
if not asleep or on the point of sleep, at least in a physical state of drowsiness 
during the lecture: In traditional terms, it would then count as a hyperbole. Fi-
nally, in many circumstances, (8) might be intended and understood as making 
a weaker claim still: that the audience, if not literally asleep, on the point of 
sleep or even feeling physically drowsy, was at least extremely bored and 
u nresponsive during the lecture (in traditional terms, it would then count as a 
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metaphor). This example illustrates two central features of relevance theory’s 
approach to lexical pragmatics — that there is a continuum of cases between 
literal use, approximation, hyperbole, and metaphor, and that the choice be-
tween different possible interpretations is heavily context-dependent.
The flexibility and context-dependence of lexical-pragmatic interpretation 
presents a challenge for both relevance theory and cognitive linguistics. The 
goal of pragmatics is to explain how hearers infer the speaker’s intended mean-
ing from clues provided by the utterance and the context. But if utterance inter-
pretation typically involves the narrowing or broadening of lexical meaning, as 
relevance theory claims, how do hearers ever recognize the speaker’s intended 
meaning? What factors trigger the narrowing or broadening process? What 
determines the direction it takes and when it stops? Similarly, if utterance in-
terpretation typically involves the use of conceptual metaphors, blending, do-
main mapping, and so on, as cognitive linguistics claims, how do hearers ever 
recognize the speaker’s intended meaning? What factors trigger the mapping/
blending process? What determines the direction it takes, and when it stops? 
Here, relevance theory has a concrete proposal to make, which may be of in-
terest to cognitive linguists attempting to answer parallel questions about how 
linguistic metaphors are used and understood. In the next section, I will briefly 
outline the basic features of the relevance-theory approach and illustrate its 
application to metaphorical examples such as those in (1) and (2) above.
3.	 Relevance	theory	and	metaphor	interpretation
The goal of lexical pragmatics is to explain how lexical meanings are adjusted 
in the course of communication.	The explanation suggested by relevance the-
ory is that lexical meanings are adjusted in order to satisfy expectations of 
relevance. In a nutshell, the theory claims that utterances addressed to one raise 
expectations of relevance not raised by other stimuli, and that hearers are en-
titled to treat the encoded linguistic meaning as a clue to the speaker’s mean-
ing, and to follow a path of least effort in adjusting this encoded meaning to a 
point where it yields an overall interpretation that satisfies those expectations.
In more technical terms, relevance is defined as a property of inputs to cog-
nitive processes (whether external stimuli, which can be perceived and at-
tended to, or internal representations, which can be stored, recalled, or used as 
premises in inference). An input is relevant to an individual when it connects 
with available contextual assumptions to yield positive cognitive effects (for 
instance, true contextual implications, warranted strengthenings, or revisions 
of existing assumptions). For present purposes, the most important type of 
cognitive effect is a contextual implication: an implication deducible from 
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i nput and available contextual assumptions together, but from neither input nor 
contextual assumptions alone. Other things being equal, the more implications 
derived, and the smaller the mental effort required to represent the input, ac-
cess an appropriate set of contextual assumptions and derive these implica-
tions, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.3
Relevance theory is based on two general claims about the role of relevance 
in cognition and communication:
Cognitive Principle of Relevance:
Human cognition tends to be geared toward the maximization of relevance.
Communicative Principle of Relevance:
Every act of overt intentional communication conveys a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance.
The Cognitive Principle of Relevance yields a variety of predictions about 
h uman cognitive processes. It predicts that the human cognitive system has 
evolved in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend spontaneously to 
pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend 
spontaneously to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our inferential 
mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive way. 
This principle has essential implications for human communication. In order to 
communicate, the communicator needs her audience’s attention. If attention 
tends to go automatically to what seems most relevant at the time, then the suc-
cess of communication depends on the audience taking the utterance to be 
relevant enough to be worthy of attention. Wanting her communication to suc-
ceed, the communicator, by the very act of communicating, indicates that she 
wants the audience to see her utterance as relevant, and this is what the Com-
municative Principle of Relevance states.
According to relevance theory, the presumption of optimal relevance con-
veyed by every utterance is precise enough to ground a specific comprehension 
heuristic that hearers can use in interpreting the speaker’s meaning:
Presumption of optimal relevance
a. The utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing.
b.  It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities 
and preferences.
Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic
a.  Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utter-
ance (e.g., in resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, adjust-
ing lexical meaning, supplying contextual assumptions, deriving implica-
tions, etc.).
b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.
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A hearer using this heuristic during online comprehension should proceed in 
the following way. The aim is to find an overall interpretation that satisfies the 
presumption of optimal relevance. To achieve this aim, he must enrich the de-
coded sentence meaning at the explicit level and complement it at the implicit 
level by supplying contextual assumptions that will combine with it to yield 
enough implications to make the utterance relevant in the expected way. What 
route should he follow in disambiguating, assigning reference, adjusting lex-
ical meaning, constructing a context, deriving conclusions, etc.? According to 
the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic, he should follow a path of 
least effort in looking for implications and stop at the first overall interpretation 
that yields enough implications to satisfy his expectations of relevance.
As noted above, the goal of lexical pragmatics is to explain what triggers 
pragmatic adjustment processes such as lexical narrowing and broadening, 
what direction they take, and when they stop. Relevance theory suggests the 
following answers to these questions. First, lexical adjustments are triggered 
by the search for an interpretation that yields enough implications to satisfy the 
expectations of relevance raised by the utterance. Second, they follow a path of 
least effort, starting with the most accessible contextual assumptions, the most 
accessible narrowings or broadenings, the most accessible implications. Third, 
they involve mutually adjusting tentative hypotheses about contextual assump-
tions, explicit content (including adjusted “ad hoc” concepts) and implications 
so that the resulting overall interpretation satisfies the expectations of rele-
vance raised by the utterance. And finally, the adjustment process stops when 
the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance are satisfied (or aban-
doned). I will shortly illustrate how this is done.
As noted above, an important ingredient of this account is the idea that lex-
ical comprehension typically involves the construction of an “ad hoc” concept, 
or occasion-specific sense, which may be broader or narrower than the en-
coded lexical meaning. Use of the term “ad hoc concept” in this connection is 
often traced to the psychologist Lawrence Barsalou (1987, 1993), whose work 
on categorization showed that prototypical narrowing (i.e., the interpretation 
of a general term as picking out the subset of prototypical category members) 
was much more flexible and context-dependent than had previously been as-
sumed. In later work by the psycholinguist Sam Glucksberg and colleagues 
(2001), and by relevance theorists (e.g., Carston 2002, Wilson and Sperber 
2002), it was suggested that the outcome of the ad hoc concept construction 
process could also be a broadening of the encoded lexical meaning. This 
opened up the possibility of a unified account on which lexical narrowing and 
broadening (or a combination of the two) are the outcomes of a single inter-
pretive process that fine-tunes the interpretation of almost every word.
A second important ingredient of this approach to lexical pragmatics is the 
assumption that lexical concepts (e.g., computer, giant) provide access to an 
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ordered array of encyclopedic information about items falling under the con-
cept. This encyclopedic information is not seen as part of the semantic content 
of the concept, but as providing a reservoir of potential contextual assumptions 
that, when added to the context, can contribute to relevance by yielding con-
textual implications. A given encyclopedic assumption will be more or less 
accessible on different occasions, and will yield different potential implica-
tions depending on what else is present in the utterance and the discourse con-
text. It will, therefore, make different contributions to relevance on both the 
processing effort and cognitive effect sides. Thus, a speaker who intends her 
utterance to be understood in a certain way should make sure that the appropri-
ate encyclopedic assumptions are accessible enough to be selected, added to 
the context, and used to derive the intended implications by a hearer using the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic.
To illustrate how this account might apply in a case of lexical narrowing, 
consider how the utterance in (9) might be understood by a hearer using the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic:
(9) Teacher, carrying a pile of essays: I need a red pencil.
As noted above, the concept red pencil is semantically vague: Its denotation 
includes any pencil that stands in some relation to the color red, and it will 
provide access to a huge array of encyclopedic information about such pencils 
and their uses. Still, according to relevance theory, the utterance of (9) creates 
a presumption of relevance that entitles the addressee to follow a path of least 
effort in constructing an overall interpretation on which the utterance yields 
enough implications to make it relevant in the expected way. According to 
spreading activation models of memory, the most accessible assumptions in 
the encyclopedic entry for red pencil at any given point will be those simulta-
neously activated by several features of the utterance and the discourse con-
text. With (9), the fact that the speaker needs a red pencil should activate ency-
clopedic information about the uses to which red pencils can be put. The fact 
that the speaker is a teacher will add an extra layer of activation to information 
about the uses of red pencils by teachers, and this will include the information 
that teachers use pencils that write in red when marking essays. The fact that 
the teacher is carrying a pile of essays will add a further layer of activation to 
this same encyclopedic assumption that teachers use pencils that write in red 
when marking essays, which should therefore be the most accessible assump-
tion in the encyclopedic entry for red pencil during the interpretation of the 
utterance in (9). By assuming that the phrase red pencil was intended to convey 
not the very general encoded concept red pencil but the narrower concept red 
pencil* (i.e., ‘pencil used to write in red’), the hearer can thus arrive at an over-
all interpretation that satisfies his expectation of relevance by implying that the 
teacher wants him to help her find a red pencil*. According to the relevance-
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theoretic comprehension heuristic, he is justified in making this assumption, 
because it is the least effort-demanding way of finding an overall interpretation 
that yields enough implications to make the utterance relevant in the expected 
way.
To illustrate how the same account might apply in a case of lexical broaden-
ing, consider how the utterance in (8) above (repeated below for convenience) 
might be understood by a hearer using the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
heuristic:
(8) The audience slept through the lecture.
On a Gricean account, (8) should have four distinct interpretations: as a literal 
assertion, an approximation, a hyperbole, or a metaphor. Of these, the hearer 
should test the literal interpretation first, and consider a figurative interpreta-
tion only if the literal interpretation blatantly violates the maxim of truthful-
ness. However, the fact that there is both experimental and introspective evi-
dence against the Gricean account when construed as a model of utterance 
comprehension (e.g., Gibbs 1994, Glucksberg 2001, Wilson and Sperber 2002) 
justifies the search for an alternative analysis of (8). According to relevance 
theory, there is no presumption that literal interpretations are the first to be 
tested. The encoded concept sleep is merely a point of access to an ordered 
a rray of encyclopedic assumptions from which the hearer is expected to choose 
in constructing an overall interpretation that satisfies his expectations of rele-
vance. Here, the encyclopedic entry for sleep might give access to the follow-
ing type of assumptions:
Encyclopedic entry for sleep:
a. become mentally disengaged
b. lose interest in one’s surroundings
c. become motionless and unresponsive
d. gradually lose consciousness
e.  undergo physical changes (snoring, slowed heart-rate, deep breathing, etc.)
In different discourse contexts, different members of this set will be more or 
less accessible, and depending on which of them are chosen, the result will be 
a relatively narrower or broader interpretation of the word slept. Here, a literal 
interpretation will result only if assumption (e) is added to the context. How-
ever, since it is extremely rare for the audience actually to lose consciousness 
at a lecture, this assumption is unlikely to be strongly activated in that partic-
ular discourse context. By contrast, the mention of an audience at a lecture is 
quite likely to activate assumptions such as (a)–(c), having to do with loss of 
interest, unresponsiveness, and mental disengagement. These assumptions, if 
added to the context, would contribute to relevance by providing access not 
only to information about the state of the audience but also to further implica-
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tions about the quality of the lecture or of the lecturer. The resulting interpreta-
tion (which would be traditionally classified as hyperbolic or metaphorical) 
would be likely to satisfy the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance. 
Only if this interpretation fails to satisfy those expectations would the hearer 
be justified in accessing further contextual assumptions and moving toward a 
more literal interpretation.
One consequence of this approach to lexical pragmatics is its prediction that, 
typically, a loose interpretation, based on a few highly accessible encyclopedic 
properties, will satisfy the hearer’s expectation of relevance without a more 
literal interpretation ever being considered. To illustrate this point further, con-
sider a recent attested example in which the word giant was metaphorically 
used. When the novelist John Updike died in January 2009, many obituaries 
contained comments such as the following:
(10) Updike was a giant.
The question is, how should this utterance be understood? The encyclopedic 
entry for giant might provide access to information of the following sort: that 
giants have extraordinary height, imposing presence, powers beyond those of 
ordinary humans, stand out from the crowd, and so on. What is interesting 
about this example is that, even though the word giant is very often used hy-
perbolically to mean “unusually tall” (as in (7a) above), the utterance of (10) in 
this particular discourse context would intuitively not be taken to implicate that 
Updike was very tall. This is so even though giants are stereotypically associ-
ated with unusual height, and, moreover, despite the fact that Updike himself 
happened to be unusually tall. The relevance-theoretic account sheds some 
light on how this utterance would be understood. In the first place, the expecta-
tions of relevance raised by an obituary of a public figure would lead the audi-
ence to look for implications having more to do with lifetime achievements 
than with physical properties. In this case, processing (10) in the context of 
easily accessible encyclopedic information about Updike’s status as a novelist 
should yield enough implications to satisfy the audience’s expectations of rel-
evance without information about his physical stature being considered at all. 
As a result, an obituarist who did want to draw attention to Updike’s height as 
well as his achievements as a novelist would have to rephrase (10) in such a 
way as to encourage them to look for further implications. One way of doing 
this would be as in (11):
(11) Updike was a giant, in every sense of the word.
This reformulation calls for extra processing effort, and according to the 
r elevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic, it should thus encourage a search 
for extra implications. An alternative strategy used by several of Updike’s obit-
uarists was to describe him not simply as a giant, but as a literary giant, or a 
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giant of American literature, again calling for more processing effort but creat-
ing more precise expectations of relevance that exclude the possibility of con-
sidering Updike’s physical stature at all.
Returning now to the examples in (1) and (2), I will briefly illustrate how 
this approach might apply in a case of each type. Consider, first, how the meta-
phor Robert is a computer might be understood in the following two exchanges:
(12) a. Peter: Is Robert a good accountant?
 b. Mary: Robert is a computer.
(13) a. Peter: How good a friend is Robert?
 b. Mary: Robert is a computer.
In each case, the encoded sense of computer activates some encyclopedic fea-
tures of computers that they may share with some humans. Like the best ac-
countants, computers can process large amounts of numerical information and 
never make mistakes, and so on. Unlike good friends, computers lack emo-
tions, intuitions, common sense, concern for others, and so on. In each case, in 
interpreting Mary’s utterance, Peter constructs an ad hoc concept computer* 
which is indicated, though not encoded, by the word computer, such that 
R obert’s falling under this concept has implications that answer the question in 
(12a) or (13a). Notice that Mary need not have a very precise idea of the impli-
cations that Peter will derive, as long as her utterance encourages him to derive 
the kind of implications that answer his question in the intended way. So the 
Romantics were right to argue that the figurative meaning of a linguistic meta-
phor cannot be properly paraphrased. However, this is not because the mean-
ing consists of some non-truth-conditional set of associations or “connota-
tions,” as the Romantics believed, but because it involves an “ad hoc” concept 
that is characterized by its inferential role rather than by a definition, and, 
moreover, because this inferential role — to a much greater extent than in the 
case of mere approximations — is left to the hearer to elaborate. In relevance-
theoretic terms, metaphorical communication is relatively weak communica-
tion (on the notion of weak communication, see Wilson and Sperber 2004, 
Sperber and Wilson 2008).
Finally, consider how the metaphorical utterance in (2a) above (repeated 
below for convenience) might be analyzed on this approach:
(2) a. Bill’s marriage is on the rocks.
Let’s suppose that this metaphor is being encountered for the first time by 
someone whose encyclopedic information about marriage contains no concep-
tual metaphors of the type marriages are journeys. In this discourse context, 
the hearer would be entitled to expect (2a) to achieve relevance by carrying 
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implications about the state of Bill’s marriage, and the most highly activated 
assumptions in his encyclopedic entry for the concept on the rocks would be 
those that apply not only to voyages but also to (some) marriages. For instance, 
both voyages and marriages have a shorter or longer duration, and may end in 
more or less desirable or unexpected ways. Both voyages and marriages have 
participants who may experience various degrees of fear or distress and need 
various forms of help or comfort if they end in undesirable or unexpected 
ways. Given this, it should be possible to construct an ad hoc concept on the 
rocks*, which is indicated, though not encoded, by the phrase on the rocks, 
and which is such that the claim that Bill’s marriage falls under this concept 
carries implications about the state of his marriage that make the utterance 
relevant in the expected way. Similar implications would be carried by a wide 
range of linguistic metaphors unconnected with the conceptual metaphor mar-
riages are journeys. For instance, descriptions of Bill’s marriage as down the 
drain, down the plughole, out the window, up in flames, on its last legs, on its 
deathbed, and so on, would achieve relevance in broadly similar ways ( but 
with subtle differences in the types of implications they activate, which would 
make the choice between them more than a purely arbitrary affair).
This analysis shows how the linguistic meaning of the phrase on the rocks 
might be spontaneously adjusted in constructing an interpretation that is rele-
vant in the expected way, even by someone with no previous experience of 
metaphorical uses linking love affairs to journeys. But of course, many of the 
examples used in both relevance theory and cognitive linguistics contain meta-
phorical expressions whose interpretation is more or less a matter of routine. 
Moreover, cognitive linguists have made valuable contributions to our under-
standing of how linguistic metaphors often cluster around a central theme, so 
that a marriage may be described, for instance, not only as on the rocks, but in 
other terms related to voyages: e.g., in the doldrums, stormy, tempestuous, or 
becalmed. I will end this section by considering how the repeated use of lin-
guistic metaphors may lead to the setting up of systematic conceptual corre-
spondences of the type that cognitive linguists have so fruitfully studied.
According to relevance theory, the lexical meaning of virtually every word 
in an utterance is contextually adjusted in order to satisfy expectations of 
 relevance. The adjustment process may be a spontaneous, one-off affair, in-
volving the construction of an “ad hoc” concept that is used once and then 
forgotten; or it may be regularly and frequently followed, by a few people or a 
group, until, over time, the resulting “ad hoc” concept may stabilize in a 
 community and give rise to an extra lexicalized sense (Sperber and Wilson 
1998, Vega Moreno 2007, Wilson and Carston 2007). As Vega Moreno (2007) 
shows, routinization affects the amount of processing effort needed to under-
stand an utterance: The more a word is broadened or narrowed in a particular 
way, the less effort it will cost to follow the same route in the future, and hence 
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the more likely it is to be followed by hearers using the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension heuristic.
Repeated encounters with linguistic metaphors linking two conceptual do-
mains (e.g., the domains of marriage and voyages, or women and flowers) may 
lead to the setting up of systematic cross-domain correspondences of the type 
familiar from cognitive linguistics, so that thoughts of marriage may automati-
cally activate aspects of our encyclopedic information about journeys, and 
thoughts of women may automatically activate aspects of our encyclopedic 
knowledge of flowers, just as cognitive linguists predict. These cross-domain 
correspondences would in turn facilitate the production and interpretation of 
new linguistic metaphors based on the same conceptual activation patterns, 
resulting in thematically related clusters of linguistic metaphors, just as cogni-
tive linguists predict. On relevance theory’s account, these patterns of activa-
tion would ultimately derive from the repeated use of linguistic metaphors, and 
thus arise for communicative rather than purely cognitive reasons.
4.	 Broader	implications
As Gibbs and Tendahl (2008: 1824) point out, relevance theory and cognitive 
linguistics differ in some of their goals and working assumptions. These differ-
ences have often obscured the broader parallels in their approaches to meta-
phor, and to lexical meaning in general. Having drawn attention to some of 
these parallels and argued that in many respects the two approaches are com-
plementary rather than contradictory, I will end by outlining some of the differ-
ences between them and considering how they might be resolved.
As noted above, a central difference is that cognitive linguists see linguistic 
metaphors as depending on pre-existing cross-domain mappings, whereas 
r elevance theory suggests that cross-domain conceptual mappings may result 
from repeated use of linguistic metaphors, but are not essential to either the 
production or the interpretation of metaphors. More generally, relevance theo-
rists see metaphors as arising primarily in linguistic communication, whereas 
cognitive linguists see them as arising primarily in thought. I have suggested 
that the two approaches could be reconciled by finding evidence that some 
cross-domain mappings arise in language and others in thought.
However, these differences in the treatment of metaphor can be traced to a 
more fundamental difference in the relative priority that the two approaches 
assign to the study of communication (as opposed to cognition). Both rele-
vance theory and cognitive linguistics reject the Conduit metaphor (i.e., the 
code model of communication) as inadequate, and both advocate an inferential 
approach to communication. But while cognitive linguists tend to assume that 
understanding utterances is simply a matter of applying general-purpose cog-
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nitive and linguistic abilities to the communicative domain, relevance theorists 
have argued that understanding utterances involves special-purpose inferential 
procedures that apply only in the communicative domain. According to rele-
vance theory, utterance comprehension involves not merely drawing common-
sense inferences, but drawing inferences about the communicator’s meaning, 
which is a complex mental state consisting of both an informative and a com-
municative intention. Inferring this meaning therefore crucially involves an 
ability to “mindread” (i.e., to infer the mental states of others on the basis of 
their behavior), and there is a growing body of evidence that “mindreading” is 
a special-purpose inferential ability with its own specific patterns of develop-
ment and breakdown.4 In fact, relevance theorists have gone even further, and 
argued that the ability to infer communicators’ meanings involves more spe-
cialized inferential procedures attuned to regularities that exist only in the 
communicative domain (Sperber and Wilson 2002).5 These regularities in-
clude the fact described in the Communicative Principle of Relevance, that 
utterances (and other acts of overt communication) raise expectations of rele-
vance not raised by ordinary actions, and underpin the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension heuristic, a special-purpose inferential procedure that yields 
valid results only when applied to overt communicative acts. These differences 
in the treatment of overt communication in relevance theory and cognitive 
linguistics could be resolved by further developmental or neuropsychological 
evidence.
It is worth pointing out that while waiting for this issue to be resolved, cog-
nitive linguistics still stands to benefit from relevance theory in two important 
ways. In the first place, cognitive linguists face a major challenge in explaining 
how hearers not only understand most metaphorical utterances, but typically 
understand them in the way the speaker intended. A pragmatic approach such 
as relevance theory, which fits well with many of the assumptions of cognitive 
linguistics, suggests a natural way of explaining how the inferences hearers 
draw in communicative situations might be suitably constrained. In the second 
place, although cognitive linguists and relevance theorists have both empha-
sized the importance of inference in metaphor interpretation, cognitive lin-
guists face a major challenge in explaining how the inferences that hearers 
draw in the course of utterance comprehension are properly warranted. Lakoff 
and Johnson (2003: 246) see the key to their approach to conceptual metaphor 
as lying in the fact that “we systematically use inference patterns from one 
conceptual domain to reason about another.” But as both conceptual metaphor 
theorists and blending theorists recognize, not all the inferential patterns from 
one conceptual domain are valid when carried over to the other. What is needed 
is some way of distinguishing mere conceptual associations or co-activations 
from valid inferences. Here again, relevance theory suggests a possible way 
out. What makes it valid to draw a particular inference in interpreting a given 
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utterance is that, unless this inference were valid, the utterance would not yield 
enough implications to be relevant in the expected way. Thus, a speaker who 
formulates her utterance in such a way as to encourage her hearer to derive a 
certain inference is largely responsible for its validity. Thus, here again, a prag-
matic account of metaphor of the type proposed by relevance theory might 
have worthwhile implications for cognitive linguistics.
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1. For cognitive linguistics approaches to metaphor, see Lakoff and Johnson (1987, 2003), Grady 
(1997), Gibbs (1998), Fauconnier and Turner (2002, 2008), Ruiz de Mendoza and Perez 
 Hernandez (2003), Hampe (2005) and Müller (2008); see also McGlone (2001).
2. For recent relevance-theoretic treatments of metaphor, see e.g., Carston (2002), Higashimori 
(2002), Wilson and Sperber (2002), Vega Moreno (2007), Wilson and Carston (2007, 2008), 
and Sperber and Wilson (2008).
3. For fuller exposition of relevance theory, and comparison with alternative approaches, see 
Sperber and Wilson (1995), Carston (2002), and Wilson and Sperber (2004).
4. See Astington et al. (1988); Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001); Sodian (2004); Matsui et al. 
(2006, 2009).
5. Further evidence that communication is a special-purpose ability is provided in Southgate, 
van Maanen and Csibra (2007); Liszkowski, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2008); Southgate, 
Chevallier, and Csibra (2009); and Wilson (2009, forthcoming).
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